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This is an important book for the trail
which it breaks rather than for the goal at
which it arrives (1). There has been in-
creasing dissatisfaction among students of
international relations with the paucity of
theoretical models. The study of interna-
tional relations has been dominated, for the
most part, by men raised in the tradition of
diplomatic history and belles-lettres. Such
work is necessary and has an important
place, but there is widespread feeling that
it is not enough-that there is need for more
theory, more model-building, more quantifi-
cation, more integrated study drawing on
the resources of all the sciences of life, man,
and society. This Journal is itself an expres-
sion of this feeling of &dquo;not enough&dquo; and of
the search for &dquo;more.&dquo; It is with a real
feeling of excitement, therefore, that I ap-
proach Dr. Kaplan’s work, and a good deal
of the excitement remains even after finish-
ing it. It represents a courageous attempt
to build theoretical systems in international
politics, using mainly the tools of social
theory. The tools may not seem adequate,
and the building may be crude (and it is
certainly dark inside!), but at least a be-
ginning has been made. It seems to me the
most important attempt to date to build
theoretical structures in this field.
The work opens with a brief-perhaps too
brief-discussion of the nature of social sys-
tems, which, I suspect, owes a good deal,
though perhaps at second hand, to Talcott
Parsons and, at perhaps an even greater re-
move, to Norbert Wiener. There is an ac-
knowledged debt to W. R. Ashby. Chapter
ii then plunges into the main thesis, which
is the setting-up of six models of interna-
tional systems. The first is the &dquo;balance-of-
power&dquo; system, which corresponds roughly
to that which prevailed in the Western
world in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. It is characterized by a small group-
six or seven seems a typical number-of
&dquo;national actors&dquo; or national states, of rough-
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ly equal size and strength. Their relations
are governed by certain &dquo;essential rules,&dquo;
such as &dquo;stop fighting rather than eliminate
an essential national actor&dquo; or &dquo;act to con-
strain actors who subscribe to supranational
organizing principles&dquo; (p. 23). It is not ex-
plained how these essential rules come to
be accepted or how an actor becomes &dquo;es-
sential&dquo; (Poland in the eighteenth century
clearly did not make the club), but the
neglect of these second-order or dynamic
considerations may be justified at this stage.
The second model is the &dquo;loose bipolar
system,&dquo; which corresponds roughly to what
we have today, in which two of the national
actors have risen to a much greater size and
power than the others, which tend therefore
to group around the two major actors in
loose blocs. The third model is the &dquo;tight
bipolar system,&dquo; in which the neutrals dis-
appear and the system reduces virtually to
two power blocs. The fourth model is that
of the &dquo;universal international system,&dquo; in
which the &dquo;Universal Actor&dquo; (e.g., the
United Nations) is sufficiently powerful to
prevent war among the national actors but
in which the national actors retain their in-
dividuality and still jockey for power and
position within the framework of the Uni-
versal Actor. The fifth model is that of the
&dquo;hierarchical international system,&dquo; in which
the Universal Actor virtually absorbs all the
others, and only one nation is left in the
world. The first five systems stand some-
what in a progression, in that a tendency
might be postulated to pass from one to
five through the others in succession. The
sixth system stands somewhat apart: it is
called the &dquo;unit veto system,&dquo; in which
weapons exist of such character that any
actor, no matter how small and weak, can
destroy any other before being destroyed
itself. The formulation of this system was
clearly inspired by the horrible prospect of
H-bombs in the possession of even the
smallest nations. It might be mentioned in
passing that, even though such a system has
never existed in international relations, the
widespread possession of the Colt revolver
(the &dquo;equalizer&dquo;) in the brief, balmy days
of the Wild West apparently produced a
system something like this in interpersonal
relations.
An economist is irresistibly reminded by
this classification of possible states of the
international system of the &dquo;states of the
market,&dquo; ranging from perfect competition
(a balance-of-power system with many ac-
tors) through monopolistic competition
(balance of power with few actors) to oli-
gopoly (loose bipolar) to duopoly (tight
bipolar) to cartelization (universal inter-
national) to monopoly (hierarchical inter-
national). There seems to be no economic
analogue, thank heaven, for the unit veto
system, except perhaps completely perfect
oligopoly where any firm can take away the
market of any other completely by the
slightest shading of its price! Kaplan’s cate-
gories are not so clear as those of the econ-
omists ; nevertheless, they mark an impor-
tant step toward a general theory of inter-
national systems. This is more than giving
fancy names to familiar things. By formal-
izing the models it may be possible to move
from the study of the actual, to which the
historian is confined, out toward the study
of the possible. This is always the greatest
task of theory: to study what is not yet, but
what might be; it is the study of the not yet
in the physical sciences which gave us the
airplane and the bomb, and we must like-
wise study the not yet in poiltical science if
these instruments of the scientific imagina-
tion are to be harnessed for man’s good.
Having categorized the possible systems,
the next step (chap. iii) is to categorize the
potential actors. Kaplan does this according
to a fourfold classification. An actor may be
directive or non-directive, and each of these
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in turn may be either system-dominant or
subsystem-dominant. The directive-non-di-
rective polarity seems to be identical with
the familiar authoritarian-democratic di-
chotomy. A nation is system-dominant if
its culture is uniform and power is widely
distributed or wielded under strong con-
sensus. It is subsystem-dominant if its poli-
cies are determined by a small group within
the nation without much regard for public
opinion outside the group. Thus Spain is a
type of directive, system-dominant nation;
Russia of a directive, subsystem-dominant;
Britain of the non-directive, subsystem-
dominant. These categorizations are, of
course, only approximate, as one seldom, if
ever, gets a pure example of a type. Kaplan
then proceeds to develop the probable
character of his six systems under the four
different types of actors and under five dif-
ferent &dquo;patterns of choice.&dquo; These five are
(i) the &dquo;organizational focus of decisions,&dquo;
which seems to mean the choice of instru-
ments of policy; (ii) the allocation of re-
wards, both inside and outside the national
actor; (iii) alignment preferences (whom
do you like or dislike); (iv) willingness (or
not) to play the current game, or to try to
change the system; and (v) adaptivity, that
is, flexibility or rigidity. It is clear that we
have here a fine set of pigeonholes ( 6 X 5
X 4, or 120 in toto), and, while Dr. Kaplan
does not attempt to fill them all, the reader
may be pardoned if occasionally he wonders
which box he happens to be living in. Still
pigeonholes are not entirely for the birds;
they are an essential feature of a developing
science, and an economist especially should
be careful about throwing stones at empty
boxes. Just to add to the boxes, there is a
discussion somewhere along the line of &dquo;bloc
actors&dquo; like NATO, which are not quite na-
tional and not quite universal and present
a curious piece of political natural history.
From the systems of Part I we now pass
to the processes of Part II. The distinction
in this work between a system and a process
is somewhat confusing. One usually thinks
of a process as something that happens to,
or in, a system-that is, if one wants to make
this distinction at all. Kaplan, however,
seems to mean by process-at least this is
the subject of Part II-the internal system
of the national actor. My objection is only
a terminological one: it is entirely proper,
after one has discussed the interaction of
national actors in an intemation system to
go on to specify in more detail why they
act as they do. Since a national actor con-
sists of a lot of people in roles tied together
with tight or loose communications, it is
clear that the action of the national actor
depends on the interaction of the people
who compose it, and the action of people
depends on their values and images and on
the regulatory or homeostatic processes by
which they try to mold the world closer to
their heart’s desire. Kaplan’s Part II is cer-
tainly the most difficult to read-it will, I
fear, be almost completely unintelligible to
those who have not done a good deal of
previous reading and thinking on these mat-
ters. It is poorly organized; there are many
forward references and too many backward
references to things which the reader finds
hard to keep in mind. Nevertheless, it is
struggling with important topics. There is
too much tendency in writing on interna-
tional relations to personify nations as sim-
ple, homogeneous, consistent units of be-
havior. For some purposes of discourse this
may be legitimate, but one should never
lose sight of the immense complexity of so-
cial organization. Kaplan in effect lifts the
lid off the smooth capsule of the nation and
reveals the pullulating mass of interacting
roles, people, and communications that lie
within. Furthermore, he sees the nation as
a cross-section of role relationships which
unite the whole world in its mesh. To revert
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again to an economic analogy, just as what
we call &dquo;international trade&dquo; is that segment
of the total volume of personal economic
transactions that happens to cross national
boundaries, so &dquo;international relations&dquo; con-
sists of that segment of the total volume of
social transactions of all kinds which hap-
pens to cross national boundaries. In the
moment of stating this view, of course, one
has to modify it substantially; the existence
of national boundaries itself profoundly
modifies both the flows of trade and the
volume of all social transactions. But at least
one must get away from the absurd Cloud-
Cuckoo-Land of popular discourse, where
large divine entities called &dquo;America,&dquo;
&dquo;France,&dquo; or &dquo;Russia&dquo; act out shadow plays
of love and hatred, greed and power.
In chapter v Kaplan proposes nine &dquo;Hy-
potheses&dquo; regarding what he calls the &dquo;in-
tegrative and disintegrative process.&dquo; These
are not hypotheses in the narrow sense of
empirically testable propositions but rather
are propositions of intrinsic plausibility re-
lated to role-formation, the range of the
field of choice, the insulation of roles from
possibly relevant information, the sources
of rigidity and legitimacy, the tolerance of
deviations, the conflict of loyalties, and the
sources of aggressiveness. The hypotheses
are not arranged in any very clearly per-
ceptible order or system, and many of
them seem to overlap. In spite of the con-
fusion and obscurity of this chapter, how-
ever, one has the impression that the au-
thor is at least confused and obscure about
something and that, if some order and
clarity could be brought into the presenta-
tion, some important insights would emerge.
The confusion of style unfortunately carries
over into chapter vi, where an attempt is
made to apply these insights-not wholly
without success-to actual international sit-
uations. Here not only are the back-refer-
ences to the hypotheses of the previous
chapter hard to follow, but several new
hypotheses are sneaked into the argument
without even telling the reader. An instance
of this is the very interesting hypothesis on
page 136 regarding the extreme difficulties
of the perceptual process in international
relations, resulting from the inadequacy of
the typology: information is crammed into
too few boxes because of the inadequacy of
existing methods of abstraction and classi-
fication.
In spite of the difficulty of these chapters,
the patient reader should emerge with some
important ideas. One is the notion of the
&dquo;metatask&dquo;-the task of redefining tasks, or
the role of role-creation. Where an organi-
zation is under great pressure, all its ener-
gies will be devoted to its tasks, and none
to metatasks; it will be enormously busy
doing what it sets out to do, without having
time to inquire whether what it is setting
out to do is the right or the sensible thing
to do. The survival of an organization de-
pends, therefore, not only on its efficiency
in performing the tasks which it sets itself
but also on its ability to reassess, in the light
of some larger values, the tasks themselves.
The nation which is hell-bent on winning
a war might even find it worth while to
have at least some people who ask whether
the war is worth winning. Another impor-
tant notion is that of insulation. This is the
knife that carves out segments of the in-
tolerable network of potential communica-
tions, partly in order that the information
input and output will not exceed the capac-
ity of the persons who occupy the roles. It
is insulation that carves a nation (or a gang!)
out of the meshed tissue of social relation-
ships ; there are gains here in limiting the
relationships to what people can &dquo;take&dquo;-the
capacity of the person for understanding,
love, sympathy, etc., being very limited-but
there are severe losses in cutting off infor-
mation which may be necessary for survival.
Another interesting set of concepts centers
around the notion of legitimacy, or habit, or
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acceptance. Still another important concept
is that of the multiple role-the person oc-
cupying several different roles. It is clear
that we are dealing here with the raw ma-
terial of very important social theory, high-
ly relevant to the study of international re-
lations. I must confess, however, that it im-
presses me as being not much more than
raw material, and much work needs to be
done in shaping it up.
Part III is headed &dquo;On Values&dquo; and has
two chapters: one a general discussion of
the realm of values, for some strange reason
relegated to an appendix; the other headed
&dquo;The National Interest and Other Interests.&dquo;
The link with the preceding part is not per-
haps made as clear as it should be, but it
is nevertheless there: the underlying theory
of behavior is the theory of homeostasis,
which interprets behavior as action directed
toward closing a perceived gap between a
&dquo;real&dquo; and an &dquo;ideal&dquo; value of some variable.
Any theory of behavior must therefore in-
clude a discussion of the ideal, divergences
from which are perceived as cues for action.
Any adequate social theory must therefore
include a study of the dynamics of value
formation. I am not sure that Kaplan gets
very far with this, but at least he sees the
problem. His failure to go very far with
the analysis, however, makes the chapter
on the national interest, in spite of some
very interesting insights, seem a little
sketchy. The basic concept is that interest
is what important people think it is, even
though what they think is by no means
arbitary. The chapter is an excellent veiled
attack on what might be called the &dquo;naive
tough&dquo; school of international relations the-
orists who assume that the national interest
is some non-subjective, easily definable,
and generally agreed-upon objective.
The fourth major section of the book is
headed &dquo;On Strategy&dquo; and consists of an
attempt to apply the theory of games to
international systems. This section is dis-
appointing. The exposition of the theory of
games is too elementary for the initiated
and too difficult for the neophyte. The ap-
plications are not uninteresting and are per-
haps less obvious to those unfamiliar with
game theory. The notion of a game matrix
as a device for setting out the problem of
decision-making under uncertainty is a very
useful one; whether the actual propositions
of the Von Neumann game theory are
equally useful is open to doubt. The main
difficulty is that game theory has for the
most part been confined to the discussion
of zero-sum games, in which one party
gains what another loses. These are actually
very rare in social life, and positive- (or
negative-) sum games raise a set of prob-
lems involving threats, promises, commit-
ments, lies, bluffs, and so on, which are
highly relevant to international and, indeed,
to all social relations. Thus one has a feeling
that these chapters are a little premature-
that recent developments in game theory
(for instance, those developed by T. C.
Schelling in the last issue of this Journal
[2] ) make these chapters somewhat obso-
lete. It may be distressing for an author to
find his work obsolescent almost before it is
published, but this augurs well for the prog-
ress of sciencel
There is one major gap in the general
discussion which is almost immediately ap-
parent to an economist. There is no dis-
cussion anywhere of the forces which de-
termine the scale of the nation. This is a
serious omission from the point of view of
the completeness of the system-indeed, it
should be the cornerstone of the whole
edifice-and it is very odd to find it so com-
pletely neglected. More than any other fac-
tor it is the forces which determine the
optimum scale of the nation that determine
the nature of the international system. There
is again a close parallel with economics. If,
because of internal limitations of some kind,
the optimum scale of the firm is small rela-
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tive to the market, we are likely to come
close to perfect competition. If these in-
ternal limitations are relaxed, the larger
firms gobble up the smaller until market
limitations come into play, and we have
monopolistic competition. At still larger size
we get oligopoly, or even duopoly, and at
still larger sizes, monopoly. Similarly in the
international system, if the diseconomies of
scale of the national unit set in at fairly
small sizes, we are likely to have a balance-
of-power system with several smallish na-
tions. If these limits are pushed back, the
average size of the nation will grow until
we get loose bipolar, then perhaps tight
bipolar systems (duopoly), and, finally, the
one-nation world (monopoly). These dis-
economies of scale are closely related to
the role and communication processes in
society; on the whole, the disadvantages of
large scale are mostly due to breakdowns in
communication, and any improvement in
communications therefore pushes back the
scale barrier and enables larger organiza-
tions to function. The world crisis today is
precisely a crisis of scale: the revolution in
communication and organization has been
increasing the optimum size of the state,
and the reduction in the costs of transport-
ing destruction has been increasing the in-
tensity of competition between states and
decreasing their viability. We may now
have reached the point where only a world
state is viable, and we are witnessing the
painful death agonies of the first four of
Kaplan’s international systems. If this theory
of scale had been explicitly included in
Kaplan’s system, it would have integrated
and related all its rather scattered parts.
By this time my reader will hardly have
failed to gather that I think this an impor-
tant book. He may also have surmised that
I think it a rather bad book. It reads like a
first draft. It is couched for the most part in
language that is pompously academic and
devoid of grace. It would, I suspect, have
been enormously improved if the author
had sat down and rewritten it almost in its
entirety and if the publisher (as a metatask)
had insisted on his doing this. It is perhaps
pardonable that a young man filled with
important ideas should want to rush into
print. I feel that the crime is all the more
pardonable in that I have committed it fre-
quently myself. Nevertheless, it remains a
crime, and a serious one. The book will not
receive the attention it deserves or get the
readers who really need it, because of this
inattention to style, arrangement, and com-
pleteness of argument. This would not mat-
ter if the content were unimportant. The
content of this work, however, is of the
highest importance. It represents perhaps
the first systematic, integrated attempt at a
theory of international relations. It gives us
a useful frame not only in which interna-
tional history can be studied but also in
which future developments may be ap-
praised. It points, like all good theory, from
the actual toward the potential. And it may
help to liberate us from bondage, in Kap-
lan’s own words, &dquo;either to a moralism
which undercuts itself by denigrating the
means necessary for maintaining values or
to an opportunism which continually de-
grades the values of the political and social
system in the guise of defense of the sys-
tem.&dquo; For the importance of its content,
therefore, I recommend it heartily to all my
readers, in the hope that one of them-or
perhaps Dr. Kaplan himself-will one day
soon use this material in writing the defini-
tive work for which we all wait.
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